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Introduction 
Philosophical scholarship in the 20th and 21st centuries has shown a renewed interest in 
the concepts of motion and activity. Within Aristotle scholarship, this renewed interest has led to 
a surge in studies examining concepts such as physis,
1
 kinēsis,2 dynamis and energeia.3 Although 
these concepts are indeed pivotal to Aristotle‘s thinking, it is surprising that other concepts, 
which equally express motion and activity,
4
 have received much less attention. Two terms have 
been especially neglected: the correlated concepts of ―acting‖ (poiein) and ―being acted upon‖ 
(paschein).
5
  
There are several reasons why this failure to attend to poiein and paschein is unjustified 
and, in fact, constitutes scholarly neglect that needs to be rectified. First, these concepts emerge 
at pivotal places in Aristotle‘s oeuvre: poiein and paschein are two of the ten categories pertinent 
to grasping the ultimate referents of linguistics, semantics, and metaphysics. Secondly, they play 
an important role in helping one understand the principles that rule processes such as generation 
                                                 
1
 Cf. S. Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982 and H.S. Lang, The Order of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics: Place and the Elements, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
2
 Cf. L.A. Kosman, ―Aristotle‘s Definition of Motion,‖ in: Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy 14, 1969, pp. 
40-62; D. W. Graham, ―States and Performances: Aristotle‘s Test,‖ in: Philosophical Quarterly 30, 1980, pp. 117-
130; D.W. Graham, ―Aristotle‘s Definition of Motion,‖ in: Ancient Philosophy 8, fall 1988, pp. 209-215.  
3
 Cf. J. Stallmach, Dynamis und energeia; Untersuchungen am Werk des Aristoteles zur Problemgeschichte von 
Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1959. 
4
 Our paper examines the general notion of motion and activity, including both kinēsis and energeia. For this reason 
we will speak both of ―motion‖ and ―activity.‖ We will explicate this further in section 2 (b) of this paper.  
5
 In our view, by translating poiein as ―acting‖ and paschein as ―being acted upon,‖ we can do justice to the 
relationship between the two terms, as it allows us to hear both the active voice associated with poiein in Attic Greek 
and the passive voice associated with paschein; for a further elaboration of the active and the passive voice, see the 
first section of our paper. However, since even such a provisional translation of poiein as ―acting‖ and paschein as 
―being acted upon‖ could interfere with grasping the full meaning of these two terms, we will mostly use 
transliterations of these terms. 
 2 
and corruption in the sublunary world.
6
 Moreover, their importance increases when it is realized 
that Aristotle appears to have devoted a whole book to the concepts of poiein and paschein, as 
Diogenes Laertius testifies.
7
  
Yet, what exactly is the significance of poiein and paschein: what kind of motion or 
activity do these two notions designate? This question is closely intertwined with an inquiry into 
the relationship between these two concepts, since they are often mentioned together and used as 
correlatives. Thus, our inquiry into the meaning of poiein and paschein needs to ask the 
important question of why there are two categories and not one to designate motion or activity. 
Although this question is hardly new – it has already been raised by Plotinus,8 among others – it 
has largely been forgotten, and its importance has been overlooked. Our paper seeks to revive the 
question of why there are two categories rather than one, and offers a new solution.  
Our main thesis is that the relationship between poiein and paschein involves a dynamic 
of attraction and repulsion, which explains both their identification with and distinction from 
each other. We speak of attraction since the two concepts at times appear to be so correlated that 
they almost collapse into one another as if they formed one concept. At other times, however, 
poiein and paschein appear to be opposed as two utterly distinct ideas (signifying ‗active‘ and 
                                                 
6
 Cf. the title of Burnyeat‘s essay ―Aristotle on the Foundations of Sublunary Physics,‖ which serves as an 
introduction to the collection of essays edited by F. de Haas and J. Mansfeld: Aristotle’s On Generation and 
Corruption I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. In his essay, Burnyeat addresses how On Generation and Corruption 
discusses foundations on different levels: physical, conceptual, and teleological (pp.13-24). Cf. also Mueller, who 
speaks of GC as ―a presentation of the general principles for studying the features of the sublunar world‖ (Notre 
Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005-06-17).  
7
 According to Diogenes Laertius, the title of this (now lost) work is: ―perˆ toà p£scein À peponqšnai.” Diogenes 
Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers V.22, translated by R.D. Hicks (London: Heinemann) 1925. Cf. also A. 
Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1864 [1963], p. 
131. The latter speaks, however, about ―perˆ toà poie‹n kaˆ peponqšnai.‖ The fact that ―perˆ toà p£scein À 
peponqšnai” has been catalogued by Diogenes Laertius among Aristotle‘s logical works leads Moraux to suggest 
that this work consisted of an examination of paschein as ―one of the categories of being‖ (P. Moraux. Les listes 
anciennes des ouvrages d’Aristote, Louvain: Éditions Universitaires de Louvain, 1951, p. 46).  
8
 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads VI.1.11 and VI. 3.28. Plotinus, Enneads, with an English translation by A.H. Armstrong, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. 
 3 
‗passive‘ causality respectively), and thereby seem to repulse each other. Aristotle‘s refusal to 
collapse poiein and paschein into one another while simultaneously showing their correlation 
demonstrates his acknowledgement of the dynamic that is at the heart of motion or activity: an 
irresolvable tension between an ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ factor that both attract and repulse each 
another. 
In the following, we will first explore the meaning of poiein and paschein in the 
Categories and On Generation and Corruption. Subsequently, we will first offer proof to suggest 
that poiein and paschein can be unified in one concept, and then arguments demonstrating the 
need for their separation. Ultimately, this will lead us to the conclusion that poiein and paschein 
are caught in a dynamic between attraction and repulsion, caused by mutual dependence and 
irrevocable difference. 
 
 
1. Poiein and paschein as correlated categories and as contrary principles of physical 
change 
  
In the Categories, Aristotle lists poiein and paschein as two of the ten categories:  
 
Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance (oÙs…a) or 
quantity (posÕn) or qualification (poiÕn) or relation (prÒj ti) or where (poà) or when 
 4 
(pot•) or being-in-a-position (ke‹sqai) or having (œcein) or acting (poie‹n) or being 
acted upon (p£scein) (Categories 4, 1b25-1b28).
9
  
 
The linguistic morphology
10
 of poiein and paschein unlocks their meaning. In contrast to the 
other eight categories that are all expressed in ―static‖ terms (such as nouns, adverbs, or 
interrogatives), poiein and paschein are grammatically expressed in ―dynamic‖11 terms, i.e., as 
verbal infinitives.
12
 Their morphology emphasizes that poiein and paschein are referents for the 
verbal constituents of sentences. From a semantic perspective, this means that poiein and 
paschein denote motions or activities. What distinguishes poiein and paschein is their voice: 
―cuts‖ or ―walks‖ are verbs designating motions expressed in the active voice13 to be categorized 
as poiein; in contrast, ―being cut‖ or ―being walked‖ are in the passive voice,14 illustrating 
paschein. 
The recognition of the difference between the active and passive voice is important, since 
it implies that Aristotle is sensitive to the various directions that motions and activities can take. 
In other words, there is a difference in meaning at the very root of every motion and activity. This 
                                                 
9
 We have modified Ackrill‘s translation. Cf. Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione, translated by J.L. Ackrill, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
10
 The grammatical expressions Aristotle employs to denote the various categories are ―grammatically 
heterogeneous‖ (Ackrill,1963, p. 78).  
11
 Cf. H. Bonitz, Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1853 [1967] 
p. 57.  
12
 This is something which they share with the categories of being-in-a-position (ke‹sqai) and having (œcein). 
However, since these latter two are missing in Aristotle‘s other discussions of the categories (except in the Topics), 
we will not elaborate upon them here. For a discussion of keisthai and echein, cf. p. 24 of Trendelenburg‘s 
Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1864 [1963], where he discusses 
the specific grammatical form of these two categories. Keisthai partly refers to intransitive uses of the infinitive, and 
echein partly refers to the Greek perfect, since – as the examples indicate – it refers to ―a possession of an activity.‖ 
Ackrill notes that these verbal infinitives ―can be used as a verbal noun‖ (Ackrill, 1963, p.78).  
13
 The active voice ―represents the subject as performing the action of the verb.‖ The example Smyth gives is loÚw I 
wash.‖ See H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, § 1703, p. 389.  
14
 The passive voice ―represents the subject as acted on.‖ Smyth mentions as examples ™wqoànto (they were pushed) 
and ™pa…onto (they were struck). Smyth, 1984, § 1735, p. 394.  
 5 
difference is categorized as ―doing‖ or ―acting‖ in the most general sense of poiein15 in contrast 
to that of its antonym, paschein, which captures the most general sense of ―being done to,‖ or 
―being acted upon.‖16 What is remarkable is that, although poiein and paschein are different, they 
are dependent upon each other as well: as antonyms they cannot be grasped without referring to 
each other.  
The antonymical and correlated character of poiein and paschein also appears in another 
work that devotes special attention to these two concepts: On Generation and Corruption. 
Aristotle argues here that poiein and paschein are explanatory of the reciprocal processes that 
take place between qualitative contraries (GC I.7, 323b30-324a5) such as hot and cold, and wet 
and dry. These processes account for the generation and corruption of the ―primary bodies‖ (ta 
prwt© sèmata, GC II.3 330b7 or t¦ ¡pl© sèmata, GC II.3 330b8) and what his predecessors 
called ―elements‖ – i.e. water, fire, air, and earth.17 
By making use of poiein and paschein as explanations for the reciprocal processes taking 
place between contraries, Aristotle shows that contrariety is vital to the relationship between 
these two notions. Notably, Aristotle states that agent (to poioun) and patient (to paschon) are 
contraries (GC I.6, 323b30-324a9) and he uses the language of ―opposition‖ (¢ntiq»somen, GC 
I.6, 323a18) when referring to poiein and paschein. In combination with our reading of poiein 
and paschein as correlated categories designating active and passive motion respectively, this 
                                                 
15
 Cf. Trendelenburg, 1863, p. 137. Poiein, as Liddell and Scott illustrate, has in Attic Greek an extensive field of 
meaning, denoting doing and making in various varieties (Liddell and Scott, 1980, pp. 1427-9.). Hence, it is better 
suited for usage in a generic sense than other verbs that denote action, such as prattein. Poiein in this broad sense 
should not be confused with Aristotle‘s use of this term in the Nicomachean Ethics. There, Aristotle uses the term in 
a much more limited sense, i.e., that of ―instrumental doing‖ or ―making.‖ It is then contrasted with prattein, an 
activity that is an end in itself. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.2 1139b1-4, VI.4 1140a1-23; see also Aristotle‘s 
Magna Moralia 35, 119713-13. 
16
 Cf. Trendelenburg, 1864, p. 137. Instead of using poiesthai, Aristotle resorts to pascho to express the passive 
voice. This is in line with its common usage in the Attic Greek language: Cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English 
Lexicon, revised and augmented by H.S. Jones, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1983, p.1347. 
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leaves us to wonder about the status of poiein and paschein: are they truly two separate concepts 
or are they to be grasped similarly to Aristotle‘s comprehension of contraries, i.e. as ―being 
different in species, but similar in genus‖ (GC I.7, 323b30-34)?18 If they are merely antonyms, 
correlatives and contraries, we have sufficient reason to assign poiein and paschein to one single 
category, instead of allocating them their own categories. Of course, this then raises the issue: to 
what category could we reduce poiein and paschein? In the following we will examine two 
options: (a) poiein and paschein as unified in the genus of relation (pros ti) and (b) poiein and 
paschein as unified in the genus of motion or activity broadly speaking.
19
 
 
2 (a) Unification: poiein, paschein and the genus of relation (pros ti)  
In his Enneads, Plotinus
20
 suggests that poiein and paschein can be embraced under a 
single heading. In his view, poiein and paschein are to be consigned to the category of relation: 
―both are relation (pros ti), in all cases where action (poiein) is related to passive affection 
(paschein); if one looks at the same on one side it is action (poiein), but if on the other, it is 
affection (paschein)‖ (VI.1.22). Underlying his suggestion is the idea that one and the same 
process can be interpreted or looked at in two ways, either in terms of poiein or in terms of 
paschein. One process – for example heating – can be looked at from the perspective of the 
heating source, and then called ―heating.‖ When looked upon from the perspective of the cold 
                                                                                                                                                             
17
 In other words, ―elements,‖ are, in fact, composites. Aristotle‘s term in GC II.3, 330b22-23 is ―mixed‖ (miktÒn).  
18
 Wildberg speaks pointedly of ―similarity in difference.‖ Wildberg, 2004, p. 231. 
19
 Other options to grasp poiein and paschein under one genus may be suggested as well. Ammonius distinguishes 
four principal and primary categories: substance, quantity, quality, and relative, and suggests that poiein and 
paschein can be grasped as a result of the mingling of the primary categories of substance and quality. Cf. 
Ammonius, On Aristotle’s Categories, translated by S.M. Cohen & G.B. Matthews, London: Duckworth, 1991, 92, 
6-11. Following Ammonius‘ lead, we could thus plead to subordinate poiein and paschein to the category of 
―qualification‖ (poiÕn), which could be justified on the basis of their constant association with qualitative change in 
GC. 
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water being heated however, we could equally call it ―being heated.‖ Heating and being heated 
are ultimately correlated, as the meaning of ―heating‖ is not complete without referring to 
something ―being heated.‖ Therefore, acting (poiein) and being acted upon (paschein) are, in the 
end, to be unified in a genus that shows their codependence upon each other: relation.
21
  
Plotinus‘ proposal finds further evidence in Metaphysics V.15, where Aristotle 
characterizes ―that which can act‖ (poihtikÕn) and ―that which can be acted upon‖ (paqhtikÕn) 
as expressions signifying relatives: 
22
  
 
Some things are said to be relative (prÕj ti) in the way that double is relative to half or 
triple to one-third, or generally the multiple to what is one of many parts, or what exceeds 
to what is exceeded; others are meant in the way that what can heat (qermantikÕn) is 
relative to what can be heated (qermantÕn), or what can cut (tmhtikÕn) to what can be 
cut (tmhtÕn), and generally what is active (poihtikÕn) to what is passive (paqhtikÕn) 
(Metaphysics V.15, 1020b26-30).
23
 
 
Equally telling is Physics III.1:  
 
Being in relation to something (prÕj ti) is attributed to what exceeds or falls short, or to 
what acts (poihtikÕn) and what is acted upon (paqhtikÕn), or generally (Ólwj) to what 
                                                                                                                                                             
20
 Plotinus was presumably not the first one to make this suggestion; before the time of Boethus this issue had 
already been debated. Cf. S. Strange, 1992, footnote 504.  
21
 For a similar but modern view on the categories of poiein and paschein, we may invoke Kant, who finds action 
and passion ―derivative concepts,‖ and who lists reciprocity between agent and patient as belonging within the group 
of relation. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith, New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1929 
[1965], B 106 ff.  
22
 Apostle, 1980, p. 87. 
23
 Sachs‘ translation, with some modifications. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 1999.  
 8 
moves (kinhtikÕn) and what is moved (kinhtÕn): for what moves is a mover of 
something moved (tÕ g¦r kinhtÕn kinhtÕn toà kinhtoà), and what is moved is moved 
by something moving it (kaˆ tÕ kinhtÕn kinhtÕn ØpÕ toà kinhtikoà), and there is no 
motion apart from things (Physics III.1, 200b29-33).
24
  
 
On the basis of the preceding passages, it is difficult to deny the correlated character of the 
subjects involved in the processes of poiein and paschein. If it is true that the subjects involved in 
poiein and paschein are correlatives, then we have good reason to infer that the processes in 
which they are engaged, i.e. poiein and paschein, are correlatives themselves and can, thus, be 
consolidated into the category of relation.
25
  
 
2 (b) Unification: poiein and paschein and the genus of motion or activity  
Although the preceding section offers ample evidence for the consolidation of poiein and 
paschein in the category of relation, we may wonder whether this unification does justice to the 
specific role that poiein and paschein play within Aristotle‘s oeuvre. Building upon another 
suggestion of Plotinus,
26
 the genus that could unify both poiein and paschein is motion or activity 
broadly speaking, including both kinēsis and energeia, and praxis and poiēsis, but also alloiōsis, 
                                                 
24
 Slightly modified translation. Unless noted otherwise, we will use Sachs‘ translation of the Physics: Aristotle, 
Aristotle’s Physics; A Guided Study, translated and annotated by J. Sachs, New Brunswick/London: Rutgers 
University Press, 1995. 
25
 Cf. Trendelenburg, 1864 [1963], p. 131.  
26
 Plotinus was presumably not the first one to make this suggestion. Cf. S. Strange, 1992, footnote 504. ―Some 
critics had already argued before the time of Boethus that poiein and paschein belonged to a single category, that of 
change (kinēsis), cf. Simplicius, 63, 6-9 and 303, 5-16. They were followed by Plotinus (Enn. VI.1.11 and VI. 3.28) 
and perhaps earlier by Galen (Institutio Logica 13,9).‖ Cf. also Simplicius, 2003, 62, 24 and 66, 16-67,8. Dexippus 
also raises this issue, see his commentary on Aristotle‘s Categories 30, 35-31,3, and he offers possible answers in 
response to this issue in 31, 3-10 (Dexippus, On Aristotle Categories, translated by J. Dillon, London: Duckworth, 
1990), which we will discuss later. Cf. also Trendelenburg, 1864 [1963], p. 132. 
 9 
metabolē, genēsis and phthora, et cetera.27 While it is true that the unification of poiein and 
paschein within the category of motion broadly speaking is of a different kind than the 
unification entailed by pros ti, the model of unification as proposed here builds upon the 
dialectical relationship between poiein and paschein as established in the previous section, and 
simultaneously shows how this dialectic between poiein and paschein plays itself out in the 
generic field of motion and activity.    
Plotinus‘ suggestion that poiein and paschein could be unified in a category such as 
motion and activity finds support in the following argument. If (1) we take seriously the claims 
following from our reading of the Categories that poiein and paschein address active and passive 
motions referred to by verbs such as ―burning‖ and ―cutting‖, and if (2), in addition, poiein and 
paschein signify physical processes between contraries as GC shows, then (3) we have sufficient 
evidence to prove that poiein and paschein are, in fact, ways of explaining motion.  
The advantage of unifying poiein and paschein in the genus of motion and activity 
broadly speaking is that it does justice to the scope of meaning within which we have seen poiein 
and paschein function so far: that of categories signifying motion and activity, and that of 
principles of physical, elemental, change. Moreover, the inclusion of poiein and paschein in the 
genus of motion or activity proverbially kills two birds with one stone: it allows us both to 
capture the specific scope of meaning of poiein and paschein, and to speak of the correlated 
character of poiein and paschein, which is so integral to these two concepts. For, as Physics III 
clarifies, motion (kinēsis) has two components – that which moves and that which is moved – 
                                                 
27
 Within Aristotle‘s analysis of poiein and paschein we do not encounter specific tools to distinguish those different 
kinds of movement. For instance, although Aristotle‘s analysis in GC I.6 and I.7 initially seems to suggest that poiein 
and paschein are to be restricted to qualitative change (alloiōsis), his association of poiein and paschein with 
substantial change (namely as elemental transformation) (e.g. GC II.4, 331a7-16) prompts us to abandon this 
perspective.  
 10 
and both are in relation to (prÕj ti) one another (Physics III.1, 200b29). As Aristotle writes: 
―what moves is a mover of something moved, and what is moved is moved by something moving 
it‖ (Physics III.1, 200b32-34). To explain his two-pronged approach to motion in terms of mover 
and moved, Aristotle explicitly calls for an analogy between the pair poiein-paschein and kinein-
kineisthai. Subsequently, in Physics III.3, Aristotle appeals to poiein and paschein to explain how 
the process of motion may involve two components whose activities (energeiai) are nonetheless 
one and the same.
28
  
More evidence for the consolidation of poiein and paschein in the category of motion and 
activity can be found in Aristotle‘s discussion of the activity of sense-perception in De Anima 
II.5. There Aristotle asserts that our senses ―produce (poiein) no sensation (poioàsin a‡sqhsin) 
apart from external objects‖ (DA II.5, 417a4-5). It is only through ―being acted upon (paschein) 
and being moved (kineisthai) by something capable of acting (poiētikou) and being active‖29 (DA 
II.5, 417a18) that our senses come to exercise their activity. This means that an activity 
(energeia) such as sense-perception is fundamentally dependent upon both the ―active‖ activity 
(poiein) of the perceptible objects and the ―passive‖ activity (paschein) of the sense-organs. Very 
similar to his ideas in Physics III, here Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that ―the activity of the 
sensible object and the activity of the sense-faculty are one and the same‖ (DA III.2, 425b26, our 
italics). In other words, while dependent upon both poiein and paschein, perception is in fact a 
single, unified activity.  
                                                 
28
 Many scholars question what this identity is. Cf. M.L. Gill, ―Aristotle‘s Theory of Causal Action in Physics III.3,‖ 
in: Phronesis 25 (3), 1980 (pp. 129-147), pp. 140 ff.; cf. E. Hussey‘s notes to Aristotle’s Physics, Books III and IV, 
translated with notes by E. Hussey, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 67. According to Aquinas, the unity that 
Aristotle speaks of here is being one and the same ―in things‖ (lecture 5, 317), i.e. ―in subject‖ (lecture 5, 318) but 
―not one and the same according to reason‖ (lecture 5, 318): St. T. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 
translated by R.J. Blackwell, R.J. Spath & W.E. Thirlkel, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.  
29
 This translation is our own.  
 11 
Briefly, what we can conclude from Physics III.3 and DA II. 5 and III.2 is that Aristotle 
explicitly uses the language of poiein and paschein to elucidate the ―active‖ and ―passive‖ factors 
involved in motion and activity, thereby offering further evidence for the unification of poiein 
and paschein in the category of motion and activity without sacrificing their correlated 
character.
30
 
Despite the above evidence however, integrating poiein and paschein in the genus of 
motion or activity overlooks one crucial fact: poiein and paschein do not only refer to the 
processes of ―active‖ and ―passive‖ motion or activity respectively, but also to the causes of 
―active‖ and ―passive‖ motion or activity. The following section will focus specifically on this 
causative aspect of poiein and paschein, which will complicate an all-too-easy reduction of 
poiein and paschein to one category.  
 
 
3. Distinction: poiein, paschein and causation  
The reduction of poiein and paschein to one, more basic concept is problematic insofar as 
poiein and paschein do not only acquire meaning through reference to one another, but also have 
a certain sense of independence. What lies ―below‖ the layer of correlated motions and activities 
is the unmistakable fact that poiein and paschein signify the different active and passive causes 
that make those processes possible. For instance, poiein does not only refer to the active process 
of heating, but also points to the role of the thing in question (e.g. fire) that brings about this 
                                                 
30
 The exclusive focus in this section on poiein and paschein as categories unified by motion does not exclude that 
other categories, such as quality and quantity and substance, may involve motion or change as well. Cf. Reale‘s 
analysis of how being as potency and being as act cut across all categories (Reale, 1990, p. 275). What we are 
arguing for is that Aristotle‘s description of the categories poiein and paschein comes closest to explicitly analyzing 
movement or activity, and specifically the different sources of movement or activity. 
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change. Similarly, paschein may imply the process of being heated, but also the underlying 
susceptibility of the substrate to be heated (e.g. the flammable nature of wood).  
GC I.7 offers evidence that including these underlying causative factors is indispensable 
to gaining full comprehension of poiein and paschein:  
 
For sometimes it is the substratum (Øpoke…menon) which we speak of as acted upon 
(p£scein) as when we say that the human being is cured (Øgi£zesqai) or heated 
(qerma…nesqai) or chilled (yÚchesqai) or any other things of this kind; sometimes, 
though, we say that what is cold (to yucrÒn) is heated (qerma…nesqai), what is ill (to 
k£mnon) is cured (Øgi£zesqai). And both are true – the same thing happens in the case of 
the agent (tÕ poioàntoj): sometimes it is the human being that we say heats, sometimes 
we say that what is hot (to qermÒn) heats – for there is a sense in which it is the matter (¹ 
Ûlh) that is acted upon (p£scei) and another sense in which it is the contrary (GC I.7, 
324a16-23).
31
 
 
As this passage indicates, there are two modes of addressing change. One view, reflected in one 
mode of speaking, pays attention to the subject that acts and the underlying substrate that is acted 
upon; the other focuses on the qualitative opposites that act and are acted upon.
32
 By including 
                                                 
31
 This translation is a mixture of Forster‘s (Aristotle, On Coming-to-be and Passing-away, translated by E.S. 
Forster, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Williams‘ translations (Aristotle, De Generatione et 
Corruptione, translated by C.J.F. Williams, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) with some of our own modifications. It 
is noteworthy how consistent Aristotle is in using active verbal voices to indicate poiein, and passive verbal voices to 
indicate paschein. Cf. also Wildberg, 2004, p. 233. 
32
 In Physics I.7, Aristotle contends that it is impossible for contraries to be acted upon by another (Physics I.7 
190b33, our emphasis). Instead, Aristotle argues there for a ―third‖ thing that is involved in ―natural coming into 
being‖ (191a4ff), namely something that ―underlies‖ the contraries (I.7 191a19). Sachs comments: ―But bare 
opposites such as white and not-white cannot turn into each other; some underlying thing that had one of the 
opposites in it comes to have the other in it‖ (Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study, translated by J. Sachs, New 
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the subject and the substrate of change
33
 in his analysis, Aristotle provides more insight into 
poiein and paschein. In the case of poiein, the initiating cause of change
34
 (for example, a human 
being who is heating something) may be associated with poiein, but also the qualitative contrary 
(e.g. the hot) that acts. When we speak of paschein, we could point to the underlying material 
substrate (e.g. a stone is being heated, but also to the affected quality (e.g. the cold). In other 
words, when addressing poiein, the initiating cause of the form of change demands recognition as 
much as the (contrary) quality that is brought about. Similarly, while addressing paschein, we 
should acknowledge the matter – the fundamental material cause that enables a subject to be 
prone to be affected – as much as the contrary quality that is affected.  
Thus, there are different ways of explaining the processes of poiein and paschein. Poiein 
pertains both to the agent (as the carrier and possessor of a certain form) and the form itself, i.e. 
the quality in question, which is one member of a pair of opposites. Correspondingly, paschein 
pertains both to the patient as the carrier and possessor which allows for a change in quality, i.e., 
matter, and to the affected quality itself. The following passage from GC II.9 explicitly connects 
being affected (paschein) and being moved (kineisthai) to matter, but also links acting (poiein) 
and moving (kinein) to ―another power,‖ presumably the source of motion which carries a 
particular form:  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brunswick/London: Rutgers University Press, 1998, p.48). When we address change, we cannot do so by solely 
referring to the extremes within which the change takes place. We also have to take into account that which is 
changing: the substrate. 
33
 Wildberg speaks of the ―carriers of the quality‖ (Wildberg, 2004, p. 234). 
34
 Cf. Physics II.3, 194b29-33.  
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For it belongs to matter (Ülhj) to be affected (p£scein) and be moved (kine‹sqai), it 
belongs to another power (˜tšraj dun£mewj) to move (kine‹n) and act (poie‹n) (GC II.9, 
335b29-31).
35
 
 
Through the inclusion of form and matter in the analysis of poiein and paschein, our 
earlier comprehension of poiein and paschein as mere correlatives or contraries unified by a 
common genus encounters serious difficulties. If paschein is indeed also characteristic of matter, 
and if poiein also belongs to form, we need to reassess the issue of the identity and difference of 
poiein and paschein. More specifically, it appears that, because of their association with form and 
matter, the meanings of poiein and paschein need to be distinguished, and their independence 
needs to be reinstated. For, as causative principles, both form and matter have a certain sense of 
independence. That even matter has a particular kind of independence can be retrieved from 
Physics I.9, where Aristotle ascertains that matter is ―almost, and in a certain respect is, an ousia, 
which the deprivation is not at all‖ (Physics I.9 192a5-9). The next section of our paper will 
elaborate on the issue of the dependence and independence of the two categories of poiein and 
paschein.
36
  
 
                                                 
35
 Modified translation. Williams translates: ―For it is the property of matter to be acted upon and to be moved, 
whereas causing movement and acting belong to another capacity‖ (Williams, 1982; our italics). Williams‘ 
translation of ‗property‘ may weaken the actual meaning expressed by the genitive of possession used to indicate the 
relationship between matter and paschein and kineisthai. Forster‘s translation renders the genitive of possession 
construction in the following way: ―for to be acted upon, that is, to be moved, is characteristic of matter, but to 
move, that is, to act, is the function of another power‖ (Forster, 1965; our italics).  
36
 This raises the interesting question of what the consequences are of this ‗causal‘ reading of poiein and paschein for 
understanding a work such as the Categories, which is presumably ‗innocent‘ on the topic of the matter-form 
distinction. Unfortunately, this discussion falls outside the parameters of this paper.  
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4. Poiein and paschein: identity and difference revisited  
Dexippus
37
 and Simplicius
38
 both offer thoughtful responses to the issue of the 
dependence and independence of poiein and paschein. In Dexippus‘ view, poiein and paschein 
can be part of one and the same event, but are ultimately different in being. Poiein and paschein 
cannot be reduced to each other: ―neither is that which acts, insofar as it acts, acted upon, nor 
does that which is acted upon, in so far as it is acted upon, act.‖39 For instance, when X heats Y, 
X is not heated by Y insofar as it heats Y and when Y is heated by X, Y does not heat X insofar 
as it is heated by X. X and Y play different roles in each process of poiein and paschein. In 
principle, poiein and paschein have distinct natures: e.g. heating, although accompanied by being 
heated, is not being heated, it principally refers to the action of that which confers heating. 
Similarly, being heated is not the same as heating. Although food, in order to be heated, requires 
a source of heating, the process of being heated has a different meaning than that of heating. 
Even in composite entities, Dexippus writes, the two processes do not ―come together 
(sunšrcetai),‖ although the two principles (¥rcai) ―show confluence (sump…ptein) into the 
same place.‖40  
                                                 
37
 In the introduction to Dexippus‘ commentary On Aristotle Categories, John Dillon writes that Dexippus‘ 
commentary offers ―a boiled-down version of the results of Porphyry‘s erudition, probably largely mediated through 
Iamblichus‖ (Dillon, 1990, p.11). In Simplicius‘ view, Dexippus added almost nothing himself to the work of 
Porphyry and Iamblichus (Dillon, 1990, p.11). Nonetheless, ―Dexippus, then, is of interest both as a surviving 
testimony to the great achievement of Porphyry in turning aside Plotinus‘ rejection of Aristotle‘s Categories and as 
partial evidence for the content of Iamblichus‘ commentary‖ (Dillon, 1990, p.12).  
38
 Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 9-15, 2000; Simplicius, in his commentary to the Categories, retrieves 
Aristotle‘s writings in a way that is appropriate to his own purposes, although this is not solely the case (e.g. Gaskin, 
2000, p. 3). He devotes forty pages to poiein and paschein. For him, the stakes are high. In order to show the 
different levels of reality emanating from the one, he needs to clarify the status of poiein and paschein, and to prove 
that ―Aristotelian categories have an application beyond the sensible world, to the mind and intellect, and even to the 
One itself‖ (Gaskin, 2000, p.2). Cf. also N. Vamvoukakis, ―Les catégories aristotéliciennes d‘action et de passion 
vues par Simplicius,‖ in: Aubenque, P. (ed.) Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique, Paris: J. Vrin, 1980 (pp. 
253-270), p. 254.  
39
 Dexippus, 1990, 31, 2-4. 
40
 Dexippus, 1990, 31, 4-6. As different principles, poiein and paschein thus coincide (sympiptein), but do not come 
together (synerchein).  
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Simplicius argues in a similar fashion, separating the activities of the agent and the 
patient: ―the agent does not undergo qua agent, nor the patient act qua patient‖41 and ―the agent 
insofar as it acts and possesses pure operation is not moved at all.‖42 Vamvoukakis renders 
Simplicius‘ reading of poiein and paschein in the following way: ―these two categories do not 
have their own being within their mutual relationship, as is the case with the left and right or the 
‗up‘ and the ‗below;‘ the agent and the patient each produces its proper work (oeuvre), the one 
qua agent, the other qua patient.‖43 Said differently, there is a significant disparity between 
concepts such as left and right which are merely correlatives and do not have meaning without 
reference to each other, and the concepts of poiein and paschein, which refer to each other but 
also have their own distinct sphere of meaning.  
The fact that the patient provides the occasion and necessary condition for an action does 
not diminish the relevance of action, or, as Vamvoukakis expresses it, the ―ontological content of 
the action.‖44 This equally applies to the patient: although dependent upon the agent, its being ―is 
not entirely dependent upon the action of the agent.‖45 In other words, the patient has a certain 
being ―that is proper to it.‖46 Vamvoukakis gives the example of a statue made of brass: ―the 
cause of the passion of the brass, for example, is not only the sculptor, i.e., an external cause to it 
[the brass], but the brass itself: it is precisely because the brass is susceptible to being 
transformed into a statue (and this ―susceptibility‖ is uniquely due to its being insofar as it is 
brass) that it provides the sculptor with the possibility of exercising his action.‖47 To use 
                                                 
41
 Simplicius, 2000, 312, 10-11. 
42
 Simplicius, 2000, 313, 9-10. 
43
 Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 256; cf. Simplicius, 2000, 299, 4-5.  
44
 Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 262.  
45
 Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 263. 
46
 Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 263.  
47
 Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 263. 
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Aristotle‘s example of medicinal food acting upon the ill patient (GC I.7, 324b1-3), the 
possibility of the patient‘s healing is due to his susceptibility to be transformed by the food, and 
this susceptibility is not due to an external cause, but to his own body. Dexippus concludes by 
saying that Aristotle distinguishes poiein and paschein ―in accordance with his views on causal 
principles.‖48 Although a process of change appears to be one and continuous, this change is due 
to different causes that converge in  one and the same place.  
 Hence, Dexippus and Simplicius offer reasonable grounds for pulling the meanings of 
poiein and paschein apart, and for establishing their independence from each other. When 
considering poiein and paschein as representative of different causal principles, their 
classification as two distinct categories is sensible as it affirms Aristotle‘s statement that the 
categories ―have different things primarily underlying them, which cannot be reduced one to the 
other or both to the same thing‖ (Metaphysics V.28, 1024b10-13).  
Yet, both poiein and paschein remain dependent upon one another and derive their 
identity in part from this dependence: in its interwovenness with matter (hylē), paschein does 
have its own sphere and responsibility, but remains ultimately dependent upon a particular kind 
of poiein that sets it into motion. It cannot create its own form or eidos – this ―radical 
incapacity‖49 is immanent to it. Moreover, when not governed by form, matter in the form of 
katamoenia obstructs nature,
50
 giving rise to monsters (Generation of Animals IV.4, 770b15-17). 
By contrast, it seems that the poiein expressed by an agent is more independent than a patient‘s 
paschein, since the agent can at least create its own eidos. However, the poiein of an agent also 
                                                 
48
 Dexippus, 1990, 31, 8-10. 
49
 Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 265.  
50
 Ibid. 
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remains dependent upon a particular paschein. For example, without the occasion provided by 
the wood, the woodworker‘s artwork could not come into being.   
Thus, it can be established that what is central to the relationship between poiein and 
paschein is a tension between identity and difference.
51
 As antonyms and correlatives, poiein and 
paschein‘s difference remains tied to the identity in genus that they share: each is to be 
understood through the other. Yet, what complicates a complete collapse of the two categories 
into one is their connection to the framework of causation. If we take this causal aspect of poiein 
and paschein seriously, then we have to contest the claim that poiein and paschein can be 
collapsed into one another as if they formed one concept and instead have to emphasize their 
difference. For, if it is the case that hylē is interwoven with paschein, and if hylē ―is almost, or is, 
an ousia‖ (Physics I.9, 192a5-9), then paschein has a certain independence.52 Similarly, the 
activity of form, poiein, is to be understood on its own terms, as the movements and activities of 
the first mover and first agent as described by Aristotle indicate. 
 
5. Poiein and paschein: the irresolvable tension between identity and difference  
To comprehend the relationship between poiein and paschein more fully we propose to 
see their relationship in terms of a dynamic of attraction and repulsion. Insofar as they are to be 
understood through one another, their mutual co-dependence attracts them so much to one 
another that they seem to unify. The attraction pulling together poiein and paschein is most 
clearly visible in correlated processes such as burning and being burned, or cutting and being cut. 
                                                 
51
 In his paper ―Aristotle and Passivity,‖ Stefano Franchi showed the tension between two different conceptions of 
―passivity:‖ ―the relational view‖ and the ―receptive view‖ (Franchi, ―Aristotle and Passivity,‖ APA Central Division 
Presentation, 2004, p.6). Our paper also, in part, takes up this issue of tension, but more broadly with regard to the 
relation between the categories of poiein and paschein.  
52
 Cf. Vamvoukakis, 1980, p.263.  
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The fact that processes such as these can only function in conjunction and correlation with each 
other indicates that the mutual attraction between poiein or paschein is so strong that it prevents 
either of them of having self-subsistence or identity outside of their relationship.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between poiein and paschein is also marked by repulsion 
since the two concepts sometimes appear to be so opposed to each other so as to repel each other 
and assert their distinction from each other. The repulsion causing the two concepts to separate 
manifests itself most clearly where poiein and paschein designate ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ causality 
respectively. For, contrary to correlatives such as left and right whose meaning is solely 
dependent upon each other, poiein and paschein each have their own sphere of meaning, such as 
becomes visible in the ‗active‘ activity associated with form and the ‗passive‘ activity associated 
with matter. Although interdependent, the poiein of form and the paschein of matter are 
emphatically different. In stressing their own sphere of meaning, poiein and paschein exclude the 
other from itself, and thereby repulse one another, leading the concepts to separate.  
Yet, as causes who often work in conjunction, poiein and paschein also remain tied to 
each other, which prevents them from separating completely. It is for this reason that the dynamic 
of attraction and repulsion is particularly well-suited to explain the relationship between poiein 
and paschein, because it (a) grasps this relationship in terms of an ongoing process, (b) elucidates 
the grounds for the dual movements of unification and distinction, (c) accounts for the dialectical 
tension that exists between those two movements, and (d) emphasizes that, no matter how far the 
repulsion extends, poiein and paschein are still attracted and correlated to each other. In short, 
the dynamic of attraction and repulsion allows us to acknowledge each concept‘s proper function 
and autonomy, while also recognizing the co-dependence between the concepts that inevitably 
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attracts them to one another. In other words, attraction and repulsion allow us to explain poiein‘s 
and paschein‘s incorporation of each other, without conflating them or overlooking their 
respective independence.  
The tension between attraction and repulsion can be explicitly retrieved on the basis of 
Physics III.3. Aristotle argues here that acting and being acted upon belong to the same 
movement, but are fundamentally different in being (einai) (III.3, 202b10). He states: ―acting is 
not the same as being acted upon, but that to which these belong, the motion, is the same‖ 
(Physics III.3, 202b24). This demonstrates that poiein and paschein remain committed to each 
other and converge with one another so as to make motion possible, but are simultaneously 
utterly distinct from one another qua causative principles and beings. In addition, Metaphysics 
IX.1 argues that the potentiality for poiein and paschein is in a way one, and in a way distinct 
(Meta IX.1, 1046a19-22) thereby enforcing the idea that the tension between identity and 
distinction is at the root of Aristotle‘s understanding of these two concepts.53  
In closing, we argue that at the core of the relationship between poiein and paschein is a 
dynamic between attraction and repulsion, caused by mutual dependence and irrevocable 
difference. The relationship between these concepts thereby comes to epitomize what is at the 
                                                 
53
 A further exploration of the tension between poiein and paschein can be found in Stoic thought in the concept of 
tension or tonos. For Chrysippus, tonos or tensional movement (tonikē kinēsis) is associated with breath or pneuma. 
The pneumatic or tensional movement gives stability to all things in the kosmos, both animate and inanimate: ―The 
inward movement or movement toward the center holds the body together and produces cohesion and unity, and 
being; the outwards movement or movement toward the periphery causes dimensions and qualities.‖ (D.E. Hahm, 
The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977, p. 166.) Hahn is here referring to 
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2.451, 452, 551. The tension between the movement inward and the movement 
outward (which happen simultaneously) makes things both unified and distinct from other beings. We could argue 
that we find some anticipation of this concept of tonos in Aristotle‘s thinking about poiein and paschein. What the 
Stoics call outward motion is the movement of repulsion that pushes poiein and paschein away from each other into 
their own distinct domain of beings; what the Stoics call inward motion is the movement of attraction that unifies 
poiein and paschein. Poiein and paschein cannot be identified without appealing to both movements. Without the 
tension between these two movements, poiein and paschein cannot emerge as the fascinating – distinct yet unified – 
concepts that they are.   
 21 
essence of any motion or activity: a dynamic convergence and divergence of active and passive 
causal factors.  
 
 
Epilogue 
Whereas we have examined the concepts of poiein and paschein so far in rather narrowly 
defined contexts such as the Categories and On Generation and Corruption,  there are many 
more places in Aristotle‘s oeuvre where the significance of poiein and paschein needs to be 
recovered. One of these works is the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly shows 
interest in these concepts, as indicated by the following sections:  
 
For excellence consists rather in acting well (eâ poie‹n) than in being acted upon well (eâ 
p£scein) to one (EN IV.1, 1120a13).  
 
A courageous person is acted upon (p£scei) and acts (pr£ttei) according to the merits 
of the circumstances and as logos guides them (EN III.7, 1115b19-21).
54
  
 
As these passages highlight, Aristotle‘s approach to the issue of virtue (EN IV.1) and to a specific 
virtue such as courage (EN III.7) consists of taking into consideration both ―active‖ activity 
(poiein or prattein) and ―passive‖ activity (paschein). This remarkable facet of Aristotle‘s 
thinking, to take into consideration in his ethics the role of the ―patient‖ and the idea of being 
acted upon well indicates that the current reappraisal of Aristotle‘s ethics and his general ideas on 
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movement cannot be complete if they discuss action and agency alone, but have to include 
Aristotle‘s ideas on suffering and patiency as well.  
Although one of the above quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics also seems to show that 
Aristotle favors ―active‖ activity above ―passive‖ activity, an understanding of motion or activity 
in Aristotle‘s ethics is incomplete without a discussion of ―passive‖ motion or activity. By 
acknowledging the fact that, for Aristotle, an agent is a patient as well, we acquire a more holistic 
view of the metaphysical, physical, and ethical world as Aristotle must have considered it – 
where agents are never considered as autonomous, but always engaged in interactions with other 
beings and forces of different kinds. Thus, this research of poiein and paschein implies that we 
need to revise our image of the ideal human agent of Aristotle‘s ethics, and thus our concept of 
virtue. 
Whereas we, modern readers of Aristotle, might tend to perceive ethical agents from a 
rather autonomous point of view, the ideal, virtuous, human agent of Aristotle‘s ethics is both a 
good agent and a good patient, i.e. a being in full interaction in the polis, acting properly in 
response to people, political events, emotions or affections (pathē), et cetera. Thus, the concept 
of virtue entails both acting well and being acted upon well. Moreover, the ideal human agent of 
Aristotle‘s ethics is a being who acts properly in response to the way he or she has been set in 
motion by the first mover, i.e. the divine (cf. Metaphysics XII.7, 1072b3-4). Thus, the 
investigation of poiein and paschein given here may provide us with a new impetus to recover 
the important interaction between ―active‖ activity and ―passive‖ activity as it comes to the fore 
in Aristotle‘s ethics.  
                                                                                                                                                             
54
 This translation is our own.  
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